The domino theory was a foreign strategy which took place from 1950s to 1980s. It was promoted by United States government, and it speculated that if a particular country is influenced by communism, then those other surrounding countries would also sail in the same boat. The domino effect argued that small changes would result to bigger changes and its sequence will go all around. This theory was used by United States administration successive during the Cold War to explain the necessity for American intervention across the global.
The foremost evidence for the domino theory is in 1975 when the communist captured three countries from Southern Asian, after the United States pulled its soldiers out of the area at the end of Vietnam War: Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge, South Vietnam by the Cong Viet, and Laos by the Pathet Lao. Lee Kuan Yew and Walt Rostow articulate that the involvement of the United State in Indochina, by allowing time for consolidation to the nations of ASEAN and engagement in economic growth, hindered a broad domino effect. McGeorge Bundy adds that the triumph for domino effect was higher in 1950s and at the begging of 1960s, but it was suddenly weakened after the destruction of the Indonesian communist party in 1965. Conversely, various proponents eventually believe that the endeavors during repression (e.g. Domino Theory) duration, finally led to the conclusion of the Cold War and the Soviet Union.
Other supporters of the domino theory argues that the history of communist government distributing relive to the communist revolutionaries in bordering nations (for example, China distributed the Northern Vietnamese troops, Vietminh, with supplies and troops, and the Soviet Union distributed them with heavy weapons and tanks). The truth that the Khmer Rouge and Pathet were initially among the Vietminh, not mentioning Hanoi’s aid for both in combinations with the Viet Cong, this also gives credibility to the theory.