In a response to both Pankesepp's and Izard's articles, Barrett et al (2007) concentrate on the three of their main concerns. First of all, Barrett et al (2007) address the value of co-relational vs. experimental studies for assessing the natural-kind model of emotion and counter Pankesepp's and Izard's claim that the evidences provided were just co-relational. Secondly, Barrett et al (2007) answer the claim that Barrett's study ignored crucial evidence for existence of discrete emotions as natural kinds. Thirdly, Barrett et al (2007) address their delusion of a different view, the conceptual act model of emotion.
Barrett et al (2007, p. 305-6) finished their article with six main points to move beyond the discussion over emotions are of natural kinds or not. First, they considered that it is important not to puzzle both affects and emotions as psychological concepts. Second, they considered themselves to be clear about whether a citation is a conceptual study or an empirical one. Third, they take care in attributing Pankesepp's and Izard's own views to others. Fourth, they avoid making claims that have been already refuted by published proofs. Fifth, they argued that researchers stand on the shoulders of those who have come earlier, even when their positions don't have the same opinion. And lastly, they have shown a possibility to build up a theory of emotion that is grounded in nature without being nativist.
In my view, Barrett et al (2007) try to explain that one needn't reach far for compelling instances of Newtonian in everyday life: "if you push something, it speeds up. If you drop something, it falls down". Individuals with complex grief demonstrate persistent and significant symptomatology (Bonanno, et al, 2007) as well as chronic disruptions in functioning that are distinct in depression or anxiety disorders (Prigerson, & Jacobs, 2001). For example, imagine the reaction to a product that breaks just after the warranty expires.
Most individuals, responding with anger and feeling of indignation, would contact customer service with the goal of either replacing the product or receiving some appropriate compensation. If, during the negotiation, we express too much anger, we may lose the ability to negotiate effectively and potentially frustrate with the service representative, thereby decreasing the chances that our goal will be met. If, however, we express too little anger, we may fail to convince the representative of our cause, and the same may also be true.
Contextually emotional responses are an integral part of our adjustment to the environment and to daily life, according to Barrett et al (2007). As such, dysfunctional or thoughtless responses can be related to psychopathology and poor prediction following potentially shocking events. Moreover, the construction of emotional context sensitivity is a useful heuristic for advancing our understanding of emotional processes and for appraising adaptive vs. maladaptive responses and has great prospective to help out in assessing prediction and outcomes in clinical behavior.
Awareness of facial or vocal response can elicit another emotion or activate masking behaviour that changes the expression of the original emotion. Re-evaluation may take place or the response can be intervallic if the elicitor proves insufficient. The response can be brought to an end before it intensifies and before influential action is taken, or the emotional stimulation may bring out a different emotional reaction (Lopez, 2008, p. 27). For example, a sudden loud noise when walking along the dark, isolated street will likely elicit a fear response. However, when the identification of the noise is a car backfiring, the threat to life and limb will be reappraised; the subjective threat will be eliminated and the fleeing behavior halted before it begins.