The running of any organization or a manufacturing plant does require efficient and effective communication. The Three Mile Island accident and the challenger disaster were because of communication failure. The nuclear power plant accident resulted due to failure of implementing recommended changes at the nuclear power plant. The challenger disaster occurred due to ignorance of the management to consider the engineering team technical expertise. Both memos were issued to the relevant personnel in an attempt to avoid anticipated malfunction or disaster in each particular scenario.
The similarity in both memos is that they addressed recommendations to prevent fatal incidents, which are disastrous to both human and wildlife. The only major difference is that the first memo, that is, the Three Mile Island accident was a recommendation of changes at the nuclear power plant whereas the second memo was an opposition to launch of the spacecraft due to low quality of seals. The first memo is a direct outline of the change to be implemented the reason behind it in a simple statement addressing the manager of the power plant. The second memo is a detailed, well-reasoned opposition to launch of space shuttle by the engineering personnel to the management of NASA (Louis, Lawrence & Keith 142).
There was a fabulous chance to prevent the Three Mile Island accident were it not for the communication failure between the manager and the nuclear services counterpart. The engineer, Kelly put the new operating instruction recommendations in simple words, which had insufficient emphasis vocabulary. This had a great impact on the recipient, that is, the manager at the power plant. Choice of words influenced the manager's conclusion on the recommended operating instructions changes. The re could be otherwise positive results if the words were convincing enough for the manager. The simplicity and plain use of language failed the expected effect as anticipated by the nuclear power services engineer, Kelly.
Consequently the rely was alarming on the engineer's side since he was aware of the implications likely to come in case the change of operation instructions were not implemented. Investigation on the basis of the events at the plant further come to be fruitless as Dun comes up with some new operation instruction which are slightly different from those of Kelly (Rothbard 67). The communication of the changes was bound to fail since the approach was not inclusive of all parties involved.
The effect was that the management resulted in proposing the Karrasach's department to solve the disagreement. Communications failures lead the senders to conclude that their recommendations were taken into account whereas they had not. The engineer could have made the recommendations in a different and comprehensive manner to get the attention of the managers in the department. Use of precise, descriptive words is effective in if employed in communication between various departments. The organization and flow of recommendations requires a logical outline to convince the recipient of the memo. This is an important aspect to achieve effective communication, which the engineer failed to employ (Mary 89).
The accident of the challenger was a sad disaster altogether also because of communication failure that occurred due to lack of full involvement of both parties before the launch of the space shuttle. The erosion of o-ring seals in the solid rocket motors during flight was the main cause of the challenger disaster. The engineering personnel ought to have prepared a detailed explanation to convince the management and present the seriousness of the fault at hand. Unlike the first memo, the memo on the challenger disaster attributes the opposition to flight to a direct aspect in the structure of the shuttles seals thus enough reason to attract the attention of the management.
The only difference is that the NASA management responded in dictatorial manner thus rendering the engineering personnel insufficient of verbal prove to stress their stand on the matter. It is outright that all the charts and diagrammatic presentation by the engineers were proving enough to postpone the launch of the space shuttle. The organization of the engineers take on the launch of the shuttle was clear and precise as they explain the vulnerability of the seals in use to erosion during flight. Information given was enough to draw conclusions on rescheduling flights accordingly.
The management ought to respect the expertise and advice of the engineers not out of anxiety to succeed abruptly in space mission. Roger Boisley gave the final flight readiness assessment: STS-51C consistent with erosion database. Low temperature enhanced probability of blow-by. STS-51C experienced severe temperature change in the history of Florida.STS-51E was likely to portray a similar behavior. In additional he wrote a comprehensive series of all reports about the lack of management support. In whichever way the management is liable for failure to respond as he fed them with the necessary information regarding the temperature prediction of about 18 degrees Fahrenheit at night Hope, (Samborn & Andrea 164). The engineer played a significant role as he also took his time to write his opposition to the statements made in Joe Kilminster's written to approve of SRM-25 readiness for flight. The reasons on the chart reviewed by the engineer had enough reason to cancel the flight on basis of safety due to seal erosion (William 132).
The word choice in the first memo needs change if they to achieve the target that the memo was meant for. The memo organization also requires descriptive words to convince the recipient of the proposal. That way it is more likely to achieve effective communication. However, the second memo had good word choice and organization outlining reason and cause of alertness. THE memo is thus an example of proper word choice and organization.